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RESUMO 
Este texto se propoe a estabelecer a relagao enfre algumas confribuigoes do nosso 
entendimenfo das instifuigoes com uma discussao do comportamento econdmico sob 
incerteza, caracferizando a realidade social como sujeito a mudangas esfrufurais imprevi- 
siveis. Adofando uma definigdo ampla de instifuigoes, incluindo convengbes, ele discute 
fres modos basicos pelos quais as instifuigoes influenciam o comportamento econdmico: 
sua fungdo restritiva, sua fungdo cognitiva e sua influencia sobre os fins. O texto rejeita, 
por conseguinte, uma abordagem reducionista no que diz respeito a relagao enfre 
instifuigoes e individuos. A fim de entender melhor a influencia das instifuigoes sobre o 
comportamento, e em particular sobre o conhecimento, o texto tambem faz uma 
distingdo enfre diferentes nfveis de consciencia e, como resultado, diferentes tipos de 
conhecimento. Finalmente, o texto estabelece uma conexdo enfre a discussao preceden- 
teea analise dos determinantes do estado de expectativa, considerando a proposta de 
Hodgson para uma abordagem institucionalista das expectativas. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE 
instifuigoes, comportamento econdmico, incerteza, conhecimento, niveis de consciencia 
ABSTRACT 
This paper intents do link some contributions to our understanding of institutions with a 
discussion of economic behaviour under uncertainty, elaborating the characterization of 
social reality as subject to unpredictable structural changes. Adopting a broad definition 
of institutions, including conventions, it discusses three basic ways in which institutions 
influence economic behaviour: their restrictive function, their cognitive function and their 
influence on ends. The paper then rejects a reductionist approach to the relation between 
institutions and individuals. In order to better understand the influence of institutions on 
behaviour, and particularly on knowledge, the paper also distinguishes between different 
levels of consciousness and, as a result, different types of knowledge. Finally, the paper 
establishes a connection between the preceding discussion and the analysis of the 
determinants of the state of expectation, considering Hodgson's proposal for an 
institutionalist approach to expectations. 
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There has been a revival in the economic profession's interest in institutions. 
The present paper is part of this development, and intends to link some 
contributions to our understanding of institutions with a discussion of economic 
behaviour under uncertainty. 
The first section of this paper briefly deals with the concept of uncertainty 
adopted here and its relation to institutions. Section 2 presents a broad definition 
of institutions, including conventions. The paper moves on, in section 3, to a 
discussion of three basic ways in which institutions influence economic behaviour: 
their restrictive function, their cognitive function and their influence on ends 
(which could be called their teleological function). The paper then further 
elaborates on the relation between institutions and individuals, by rejecting, in 
section 4, a reductionist approach to this relation. In order to better understand 
the influence of institutions on behaviour, and particularly on knowledge, in 
section 5 the paper distinguishes between different levels of consciousness and, 
as a result, different types of knowledge. The paper closes by establishing a 
connection between the preceding sections on institutions and the analysis, 
developed in Dequech (1999a), of the determinants of the state of expectation. 
1. THE CONCEPT OF UNCERTAINTY AND ITS RELATION TO 
INSTITUTIONS1 
Uncertainty is understood here in a fundamental sense (as in a tradition inspired 
by the work of KNIGHT, 1921, and KEYNES, 1936, 1937). More precisely, 
uncertainty is conceived of as a lack of knowledge about the future (and 
therefore as an epistemological problem) that is the counterpart of an ontological 
characterization of social reality as subject to unpredictable structural changes. 
This lack of knowledge is represented by the impossibility of a decision-maker 
having a complete list of possible future states of the world and forming a 
unique, additive and fully reliable probability distribution regarding future events 
or outcomes. This impossibility is due to the fact that events that are 
unimaginable in the present may occur in the future. The future cannot be 
anticipated by a fully reliable probabilistic estimate because the future is yet to be 
created. Surprises may occur, both as intended and as unintended consequences 
of human action. The very decisions that would require a fully reliable 
probabilistic guide may change the socio-economic future in an unpredictable 
way, and this possibility of change prevents such a fully reliable guide from 
existing. 
I This section is based on DEQUECH (1999b). 
Est. econ., Sao Paulo, 29(4):551-573, out-dez 1999 
David Dequech 553 
The problem is not merely that we do not have enough information to reliably 
attach probabilities to a given number of events. An event which we cannot yet 
imagine may occur in the future. As we cannot imagine it in the present, we 
cannot attribute to it any probability. This means that some relevant information 
cannot be known, not even in principle, at the time of making many important 
decisions. 
The best example of human creativity and of unpredictable structural change in 
the economic sphere is the introduction of technological or managerial 
innovations, as in Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. Historical 
changes can also be of a more typically political or cultural nature. They have a 
significant impact on preferences, work relations, the workers' bargaining power, 
government decisions, etc. 
Ail this is still insufficient to characterize the concept of fundamental uncertainty 
adopted here. The characterization of fundamental uncertainty by the possibility 
of creativity and structural change is basically an ontological one. This ontological 
criterion has been adopted by Davidson (1996) to distinguish uncertainty from 
other situations, based on the difference between what he calls a transmutable 
and an immutable reality. The ontological side of the discussion about uncertainty 
inevitably has a counterpart in terms of the type of knowledge that people can 
or cannot have under fundamental uncertainty. It is necessary to examine in 
more depth both the ontological conception of economic reality and its 
counterpart in terms of knowledge. 
The counterpart, in terms of knowledge, of the ontological conception of 
economic reality as subject to unpredictable structural changes is fundamental 
uncertainty. But does this uncertainty imply complete absence of knowledge, 
that is, complete ignorance (or unknowledge, to use Shackle's expression)? First 
of all, people are or at least may be aware of uncertainty itself. In Hicks's 
(1977, vii) aphorism, people [may] know they don't know. Can people know 
more than that? As the type of knowledge of reality that is possible for us to 
have depends on the characteristics of reality, the question then becomes: is 
there an ontological basis for some knowledge in a transmutable reality? That 
depends on whether there is more to be said of the ontology of such a changeable 
reality. 
It is here that the relation between the concept of uncertainty and institutions 
becomes of crucial importance. There is indeed more to be said of ontology, 
particularly regarding the existence of social practices that lend stability to 
economic reality. These social practices are institutions (to be properly defined 
below). Perhaps the least controversial of these practices are those related to 
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the existence of some legal institutions. For example, legal contracts regulate 
the future values of nominal variables. Ontologically, the existence of legal 
contracts has to be associated with the existence of another institution, the 
State, which is supposed to enforce contracts. The existence of contracts and 
the State rules out at least some events or outcomes which would be possible or 
more likely otherwise. Another type of legal institution that provides stability 
to a transmutable reality is a market-maker. In a market for a durable asset, the 
market-maker is responsible for providing orderliness, significantly reducing 
the magnitude of possible changes in the asset spot price. Prices are more stable, 
even if not rigid, than they would be in the absence of a market-maker. In 
addition to legal institutions, there are also more informal institutions which 
lend stability to economic reality. This should become clearer after institutions 
are properly conceptualized and their influence on economic behaviour discussed. 
The inclusion of institutions allows an elaboration of the ontological 
characterization of economic reality which in turn results in a more detailed 
epistemological counterpart. Institutions provide an ontological basis for the 
existence of some kind of knowledge even in a reality subject to unpredictable 
structural changes. 
Therefore, fundamental uncertainty does not imply complete ignorance. It is a 
matter of degrees, depending on institutions that reduce or increase it. Not all 
depends on factors such as animal spirits or creativity. By saying more of social 
reality than arguing that it is subject to unpredictable structural changes, one 
can then more easily maintain that the consideration of uncertainty in a 
fundamental sense does not lead to theoretical nihilism - and therefore refute 
the accusations of Coddington (1982) and others.2 
If fundamental uncertainty implied complete ignorance and were not a matter 
of degrees, institutions would not matter as part of the ontological 
characterization of reality, at least not in terms of their consequences for what 
people can know. In particular, the influence of institutions on economic 
behaviour under uncertainty could not include what is discussed below as their 
cognitive function. 
2 An important difference between the approach to uncertainty defended here and that of Davidson 
and others is that the former explicitly links an elaboration of the ontological characterization of 
reality via institutions with the possibility of some kind of knowledge under uncertainty. Although 
Davidson occasionally relates institutions to the formation of what he calls sensible expectations, 
he has tended to deny that uncertainty is a matter of degrees and to overemphasize factors such 
as animal spirits. 
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2. THE CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONS, CONVENTIONS AND 
HABITS 
According to Maki (1993, p. 13), a completely satisfactory definition of an 
institution does not yet exist. I shall not try to provide one here. Neale (1987, 
p. 228-29) states that for institutionalists, institutions are similar to culture in 
the understanding of social scientists.3 Hodgson (1994, p. 47) argues that 'for 
institutional economists, an institution refers to any kind of habituated behaviour 
that is rooted in a group, community or society. It covers formal institutions or 
organizations such as corporations, associations, armies and states, but it is more 
general and is not confined to them' (see also HODGSON, 1988, p. 10; GORDON 
AND ADAMS, 1989, p. 17-18). Neale's and other writers' definition includes 
not only patterns of behaviour but also of thought. Thus, a broad definition 
encompasses different meanings given to the term, according to which institution 
applies to: (a) social habits or socially diffused routines and ways of thought; 
(b) social norms; (c) organizations or collective agents. 
Some authors propose that organizations be taken from under this umbrella and 
thus do not consider it an adequate definition - see Kapp (1968, p. 92), Bromley 
(1989, p. 22-23), North (1990, p. 4) and Khalil (1995). When adopting the 
broader concept, as I do here, one has to acknowledge the existence of different 
types of institutions. 
Routines are by definition recurrent in time, but they are not necessarily 
institutions, because they can be strictly individual. The same is true of habits. 
A routine is a particular act performed regularly, and so is a habit. Perhaps a 
good way of distinguishing routines from habits is by saying that the latter are 
not performed consciously, while routines may be. A habit, then, is a particular 
type of routine. When they are socially spread, habits and routines are 
institutions. 
Social norms are socially shared and/or prescribed standards of behaviour with a 
normative content enforced upon the individual by external pressure. Legal 
norms are social norms enforced by the legal system. Other types of social norms 
are informally enforced by the approval or disapproval of other people in the 
3 GRUCHY (1987, p. 3, 15) uses the labels 'homo culturalis' and 'homo institutionalis' as 
substitutes for the neoclassical Ttomo economicus'. Similarly, JENSEN (1987, p. 118-19) explains 
that institutionalists constructed the alternative concept of a 'multidimensional human being who, 
for want of a better term, may be labeled the "socio-eulPural person' The institutionalist notion of 
culture is non-individualistic (see MAYHEW, 1987; HODGSON, 1993a, p. 156). 
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group or community (contrast this with ELSTER, 1989, p. 100, who excludes 
legal norms from his definition of social norms). 
Conventions are socially shared and/or prescribed patterns of behaviour and 
thought. Thus, conventions are institutions.4 Some authors tend to conceive of 
conventions as social rules that a group of people ought to follow. I prefer a less 
restrictive definition, because many types of behaviour referred to as conventions 
in the economic literature do not have this normative character. This less 
restrictive definition is particularly useful to deal with unconventional economic 
behaviour or, more precisely, with behaviour that is, at least in part, 
unconventional. Conventions (institutions) with a normative content are, then, 
social norms. 
The concern with unconventional aspects of economic behaviour underlies the 
difference between the definition of convention adopted here and the one 
proposed by Lewis (1969). The latter, according to which a convention is also a 
collective standard of behaviour, is more restrictive than the former, for it requires 
everyone to conform to the convention when there is an expectation that others 
will do the same (although Lewis is not always so restrictive - see BROMLEY, 
1989, p. 79n and FAVEREAU, 1988a, p. 156). 
Following Lewis and others, game theory has defined a convention (or an 
institution, as it is sometimes called) as a solution to a coordination or a 
prisoner's dilemma game with multiple equilibria (for recent surveys, see 
YOUNG, 1996 and especially LECQ, 1996). Developing Lewis's analysis also 
in a game-theoretic context, Schotter (1981, p. 11) distinguishes between 
conventions and institutions by saying that the former are self-enforcing while 
the latter need not be so, and thus may require an external sanction. In either 
case, it is not in the individual's interest to abandon a convention or institution.5 
Note that a convention may become established by some external authority 
and, once established, be self-enforcing (as in YOUNG, 1996, p. 106). 
4 While I agree with LEIBENSTEIN (1984, p. 77) that conventions are regularities of behaviour 
with a high degree of adherence, I do not follow his definition of institutions as nonlocal 
conventions, that is, conventions with a broad range of operation (for example, a city rather 
than a single company). 
5 With Schotter's distinction between conventions and institutions, an anonymous referee's 
suggestion that it is easier for one to abandon a convention than an institution may be valid, 
since there would be no external sanctions in the former case. However, one would not want to 
do so, as long as one expects others to keep following the convention. 
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However, game theory, as much as it is concerned with the interdependence of 
individual decisions, is not of interest in the present context, for it traditionally 
abstracts from fundamental uncertainty - see Shackle (1972, p. 422-26), for an 
early critique, and, regarding the Bayesian foundations of game theory, Binmore 
(1987; 1993); other, related criticisms of this literature on conventions/ 
institutions in game theory are made by Mirowski (1986).6 
The distinction between conventions and institutions in terms of self- 
enforceability could be used in contexts other than game theory. As Lecq (1996, 
p. 417) also notes, old and new institutional economists adopt a broader notion 
of institutions, which includes conventions. I follow this institutionalist tradition 
in treating conventions as institutions. In my view, a convention is followed by 
most people in the environment it applies to (otherwise it ceases to be a 
convention), but a few individuals may intentionally flout the convention without 
necessarily behaving against their self-interest, so that not everyone considers 
the convention self-enforceable. In the economic sphere, the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur or firm provides an important example of partly unconventional 
behaviour that is not necessarily irrational. This example is of particular 
importance for those concerned with relating institutions and conventions to 
fundamental uncertainty, as the possibility of innovation is a major source of 
this type of uncertainty. (DEQUECH, 1997) 
Thus, defining conventions as institutions makes the present paper compatible 
with the terminology adopted in a large part of the old and new institutionalist 
literature. Additionally, this definition allows the consideration of unconventional 
behaviour that is not necessarily against an individual's self-interest (and, 
therefore, is not necessarily irrational). Furthermore, considering conventions 
as a type of institution opens the way for connecting the literature on institutions 
with the Post Keynesian discussions of conventions under uncertainty, which 
facilitates a combination of the institutionalist detailed treatment of institutions 
with the Post Keynesian detailed treatment of uncertainty. Keynes did not 
explicitly define convention and can be summarized as referring, rather loosely, 
to (a) the assumption that the current situation will continue to exist in the 
future, unless specific indicators in the contrary direction appear, and (b) the 
resort to the average or majority opinion. (KEYNES, 1936, p. 152-53; 1937, p. 
6 It should be noted, however, that game theory has begun to incorporate recent developments in 
decision theory which go beyond the standard, weak notion of uncertainty prevalent in 
mainstream economics (e.g., DOW AND WERLANG, 1994 and LO, 1996). As discussed 
elsewhere, these developments have failed to adequately deal with the fundamental uncertainty 
associated, for instance, with the possibility of innovation. 
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114, 124) This has inspired several interpretations or developments of a 
Keynesian concept of convention. (DEQUECH, 1999c) 
3. INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOUR 
It is possible, based on the work of several institutionalists, to identify at least 
three basic types of influence that institutions have on economic behaviour. The 
first, which may be called their restrictive function, consists in their role as 
constraints on economic behaviour. The second refers to their influence on 
people's perception of reality. The second case has to do with what Hodgson 
(1989a, p. 110) calls the cognitive function of institutions. These two functions 
of institutions are not totally independent of one another, since restrictions 
themselves can under certain circumstances be seen as information providers. In 
particular, if they restrict the behaviour of several people, they help each person 
to imagine the possible decisions of the others. Although the distinction between 
these functions is not absolute, it is useful, among other reasons, for contrasting 
the institutionalist and the neoclassical treatment of institutions, since the latter 
has tended to emphasize the role of institutions as constraints.7 Institutions 
perform a third function through their influence on the ends that people pursue. 
Neale (1987, p. 228-29) describes the restrictive function of institutions, 
although he does not use this expression. He writes that 'a culture [institutions, 
for him] defines the permissible and the forbidden, defines right and wrong, the 
admirable and its opposite, gives content to these definitions with rules for behaviour, 
and so provides opportunities as well as limits. ... Institutions imply "you may" as well 
as "thou shall not".'' Post Keynesians such as Carvalho (1983-84, p. 279) and 
McKenna and Zannoni (1993, p. 402) share this view. Social norms, as defined 
above, are the specific type of institution which works as a constraint. 
7 According to FUSFELD (1989, p. 361), some more sophisticated neoclassical analyses consider 
that "choices may also be constrained by the institutionalists^ "socio-cultural environment". But in 
conventional theory the key concept is individual choices with constraints.' Fusfeld does not refer to 
New Institutional Economics (NIE). Its neoclassical faction, in which the majority of NIE 
belongs (RUTHERFORD, 1994, p. 3), has been attempting to broaden the mainstream 
treatment of institutions. However, KHALIL (1995, p. 452) argues that NIE still focuses on 
institutions as constraints. This is true for most NIE. See also FAVEREAU (1989) on extensions 
of neoclassical theory (including part of NIE) which endogeneize institutional constraints by 
transforming them into rules accepted by mutual consent. 
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Fusfeld (1989) and Hodgson (1988, p. 134) criticize the negative view that 
neoclassical theory has of institutional constraints. These constraints can be 
treated as elements that bring order to economic life. (CARVALHO, 1983-84) 
Furthermore, an overemphasis of the restrictive function of institutions prevents 
one from adequately seeing their cognitive function, which has also been 
highlighted by institutionalists. This cognitive function refers, firstly, to the 
information that institutions provide to the individual, including the indication 
of the likely action of other people.8 I call this the informational-cognitive 
function of institutions. Secondly, the cognitive function of institutions includes 
also their influence on the very perception that people have of reality, that is, on 
the way people select, organize and interpret information. I call this their deeper 
cognitive function. This point, while commonly emphasized by the Veblen- 
Commons variety of institutionalism, is also made by a few scholars closer to 
NIE (STREIT, MUMMERT AND KIWIT, 1997; KNIGHT, 1997). Among 
these scholars, Denzau and North (1994) highlight a specific aspect of the 
deeper cognitive function of culturally shared mental models9 by pointing out 
their importance to the process of learning: a culturally shared mental model 
expedites the process by which people learn directly from experience; it also 
facilitates communication between people, which is crucial for them to learn 
from each other's experiences; in addition, the cultural heritage helps to transfer 
perceptions to other generations. 
For Khalil (1995, p. 452), "the main thrust of old institutional economics is the 
modelling of institutions as determinants of the agent's cognitive ability'' (as 
paradigms, in Khalil's words). In general, old institutionalists attribute to 
institutions a broader and deeper cognitive function than members of other 
schools of thought that also emphasize the role of institutions. Nevertheless, 
Lawson (1985, p. 917-20) and McKenna & Zannoni (1993, p. 402-3), for 
example, when discussing Keynes, treat the influence of the social context on 
8 See HODGSON (1988, chapter 6). For a new institutionalist perspective, see LANGLOIS 
(1986, p. 18) and KNIGHT (1997, p. 694-95). An earlier discussion appears in NEWMAN 
(1976). For NEALE (1987, p. 229), 'institutions are the "habits of use and wont" (the phrase is 
Veblen's) that allow people to act with a high degree ofconfidence in their expectations ofhow other people 
will respond to their actions, and that allow other people to interpret actions and to respond intelligently. 
Institutions give meaning and continuity to actions and assure that each action fits with some of the 
actions of other people to maintain ongoing processes.'' This can be seen as a developed form of expressing 
the idea that institutions help give order to economic life. An important issue is, in Neale's 
terms, the degree of confidence and sureness associated with the information provided by 
institutions. 
9 Denzau and North call these models ideologies, used to interpret reality, and conceive of 
institutions just as rules of the game (constraints), used to structure and order the external 
environment. 
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knowledge in a manner that resembles the institutionalist approach, even if 
with a different wording (see also ROTHEIM, 1989-90, p. 323; PETERSON, 
1984, p. 433). 
Finally, institutionalists stress that ends are influenced by the social environment 
(see, for example, GRUCHY, 1972, p. 290-92; HODGSON, 1988, p. 10, 124; 
FUSFELD, 1989, p. 362-64). Neoclassical economists may accept this social 
influence on ends, but they too often do not pay sufficient attention to it. They 
usually assume that people pursue their self-interest, but, like other ends, self- 
interest is culturally conditioned. Some forms of social arrangement may 
stimulate self-interested behaviour more than others, or may make self-interest 
assume a more individualist or selfish character than others. 
Jensen (1987, p. 118-19) states that for institutionalists the 'socio-cultural person' 
(as opposed to homo economicus), influenced by a changing society, 'pursues a 
multiplicity of goals and objectives' (also SCREPANTI, 1995). In my view, this 
social influence makes it more clearly possible that people simultaneously pursue 
different ends which may not be easily reconciled (see also ISAAC, 1997, p. 
565). 
Moreover, the possibility of social change (an important source of uncertainty) 
leads to the possibility of a change in ends. Therefore, ends must be understood 
socially and historically, instead of being seen as natural and/or eternal, i.e., as 
existing in all forms of society and/or at all times, past, present and future. 
4. REJECTING RED UCTIONISM 
Acknowledging the important influence of institutions immediately implies 
rejecting any voluntarist or subjectivist view of individual behaviour.10 At the 
same time, it is essential to avoid 'institutional determinism', which, as Adams 
(1994, p. 336) puts it, 'results from imbuing culture, rules, customs, and laws with 
10 By this I mean that, if institutions strongly influence individual behaviour in the ways discussed 
above, then this behaviour is not totally specific of a particular individual, but rather has several 
aspects which are intersubjectively shared with other individuals operating in a similar context. 
The same argument is true of the type of institutions represented by conventions, which, contrary 
to the suggestion of an anonymous referee, are not conceived of here as being more 'subjective' 
than institutions. Even if we were to think of conventions as informal institutions, conventions 
would still be intersubjective. Conventions are a crucial factor in the socialization of any indivi- 
dual. I am thankful to that referee for forcing me to clarify this point. 
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an excessive capacity to prefigure individual actions? In sum, it is necessary to reject 
reducing individuals to society and vice versa. This implies going beyond the 
dichotomy between agency and structure, free will and determinism, 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism, etc. 
As the discussion in the preceding section about the influence of institutions on 
individual behaviour owes much to the (old) institutionalist tradition, it is useful 
to note that economists working in this tradition have often been accused of 
the second type of reductionism. However, several of them adopt an anti- 
reductionist stance - for example, Miller (1978), Mayhew (1987), Hodgson 
(1988, 1993a), Rutherford (1989a, 1989b, 1994), Samuels (1990a, 1990b) and 
Adams (1994). 
To be sure, many institutionalists are self-proclaimed holists. Holism is viewed 
by some critics as implying reductionism. For Rutherford (1994, p. 38), different 
institutionalists display various degrees of holism and only some are extremists. 
However, as Hodgson (1989b, p. 251) and Rutherford (1989b, p. 301; 1994) 
note, terms such as determinism and holism have not been given very precise 
meanings (also LANGLOIS, 1989, p. 285-86). In part due to its complexity, 
the discussion has been marked by an enormous semantic confusion.11 More 
important than the label used is whether the analysis is reductionist or not. 
For at least some of those institutionalists who maintain that the influence of 
institutions on individual perception and action does not imply that individuals 
are mere passive reactors, an essential argument is based on the emphasis given 
by institutionalists to the process of institutional change. According to Mayhew 
(1989, p. 325, 327), the Veblen/Ayres strand of institutional economics has 
developed the idea that purposive behaviour causes socioeconomic change by 
creating 'new tools for manipulation of the physical world? Similarly, Hodgson (1988, 
p. 140) points out the potential for cumulative instability in Veblen's theory 
and refers to 'the clashing new conceptions and traditions thrown up with each 
innovation in management and technique? 
11 For example, HODGSON (1993b, p. 110-11) argues that holism is a troublesome term: ''There 
is a danger that holism itself becomes one-sided and perhaps even reductionist: in social analysis a mirror 
image of methodological individualism? Hodgson suggests that institutionalists substitute organicism 
for 'the much abused notion of holism'. Unfortunately, as DOW (1991, p. 148-49) shows in 
her account of Keynes's epistemology, the term organicism also creates confusion. The expression 
'methodological individualism' is not free of semantic controversy either. For LANGLOIS (1989, 
p. 285), methodological individualism is not necessarily opposed to seeing social wholes as 
more than the sum of the parts or to arguing that society influences individual aims and purposes 
(also RUTHERFORD, 1989a, p. 169n; 1994, p. 36; BOETTKE, 1995, p. 28). 
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However, Rutherford (1989b, p. 313-14) accuses some of his fellow 
institutionalists of tending cto see institutional change as an outcome of a process 
involving virtually autonomous social forces (institutions versus technology) that 
impinge on individuals'1 \ ... "this [extreme] holistic view implies that change only occurs 
as the result of the overwhelming impact of some outside, supraindividual, 'power!'"12 
Thus, concern with structural change does not per se indicate a rejection of 
reductionism. 
In traditions of economic thought other than institutionalism, some authors 
also share the sort of anti-reductionism defended here.13 This is the case, for 
instance, of Dow (1988, 1990) and Rotheim (1989-90), within Post 
Keynesianism.14 Post Keynesians have to be mentioned in this context because 
of their emphasis on uncertainty.15 Shackle has a positive influence on Post 
Keynesians in this and other aspects, but Shackle's work is subject to criticism 
for neglecting the social context and tending to extreme subjectivism and 
voluntarism - see Giddens (1979, p. 70), Carvalho (1983-84), Hodgson (1989a) 
and Davidson (1993). 
Surely, individuals can be creative, in the sense of originally producing change 
and not merely devising new habits, new rules to adapt to some change. 
Moreover, individuals create the future not simply by innovating or by being 
12 RUTHERFORD (1989b, p. 313-14) exempts Commons and (partially) Veblen from this 
accusation. HODGSON (1988, p. 57) also distinguishes Commons from Veblen (andMitchell) 
in this regard; but he states that they all 'have an explicit notion of purposeful, individual human 
action'. 
13 From a neo-Schumpeterian perspective, DOSI (1988) criticizes a reductionist analysis of 
institutions, but he means reductionism of a different kind. He is against the reduction of 
institutional issues to exceptions, anomalies and particular cases of a framework based on Gene- 
ral Equilibrium theory. 
14 Post Keynesians are also against yet another type of reductionism, namely that of the 
microfoundations project, i.e., the attempt to reduce macroeconomics to microeconomics. Here 
is another example of how the term 'holism' has been used. DOW (1985, p. 16) associates 
holism with 'a general perception of how the system works'. One aspect of Dow's definition of 
holism is the concern with the fallacy of composition (p. 83). This goes against the 
microfoundations project, as is clear, for example, in Keynes's analysis of the paradox of thrift or 
of the effects of money-wage cuts on employment, where it is shown that a form of reasoning 
that might seem at first plausible for an individual or a firm does not necessarily apply to the 
economy as a whole. The concern with fallacies of composition at least in part underlies Dow's 
characterization of Keynes's methodological framework as 'holistic, rather than piecemeal' (p. 
59). 
15 Institutionalists may not give as much emphasis to problems of knowledge and uncertainty as 
others, but they do relate their approach to the open nature of the economic process: 'The view 
that they hold ...is that there is no final or inevitable end to processual development.'' (GRUCHY, 
1987, p. 22) 
Est. econ., Sao Paulo, 29(4):55T573, out-dez 1999 
David Dequech 563 
bolder than the majority, which only some do, but also by imagining the future 
and deciding what to do based on this imagination, which applies to all 
individuals. Individuals and their interaction can structurally change the economic 
situation, including through the unintended consequences of individual actions. 
If one recognizes this, one must also consider that people have to creatively 
imagine the future in their minds and act accordingly. At the same time, one 
should avoid 'extreme forms of subjectivism whereby beliefs are treated merely as 
creative acts of the imagination3 (LAWSON, 1987, p. 963; also ROTHEIM, 
1995, p. 174) 
A strong case against reductionism can be made without a commitment to any 
particular theory or school of thought, as in Lawson's (1997, p. 166-70) recent 
economic methodological discussion.16 
5. LEVELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
KNOWLEDGE 
The reference made above to habits automatically indicates that behaviour is 
not always fully conscious and does not take place at only one level of 
consciousness. We can identify at least three such levels: (1) consciousness; (2) 
subconsciousness; and (3) unconsciousness. A more detailed distinction could 
be made (see HODGSON, 1988, p. 109-111), but for the purposes of this 
paper it is sufficient to identify the presence of habits and of what Michael 
Polanyi called tacit knowledge at the intermediate, subconscious level. 
In connection with tacit knowledge, subconsciousness is sometimes referred to 
as 'practical consciousness', as distinct from 'discursive consciousness' (e.g., 
LAWSON, 1997). These latter terms are borrowed from Giddens, who states 
(1979, p. 57) that practical consciousness is "tacit knowledge that is skilfully applied 
in the enactment of courses of conduct but which the actor is not able to formulate 
discursively I I like to say that in these cases something is easier done than said, 
contrary to the usual expression. Several skills can be acquired through practice 
without being discursively dealt with. 
16 It should also be noted that the issue of agency and structure has long been a focus of attention 
in social theory, with important contributions to overcoming the dichotomy between them - 
e.g., BOURDIEU (1981) and GIDDENS (1984); for a discussion with special reference to 
economics, see GRANOVETTER (1985). 
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Habits can thus embody tacit knowledge.17 However, some habits may result 
from the repetition of acts initially performed at a discursively conscious level. 
Similarly, some of the knowledge embodied in acts performed subconsciously 
may be expressed verbally, if necessary. If the expression 'tacit knowledge', as 
usually employed, is not suitable for these cases, perhaps 'practical knowledge' 
would be a good expression to designate, more generally, the knowledge 
embodied in acts performed subconsciously, be such knowledge tacit or not.18 
These habits or practices may be individual or they may be shared by a group 
(such as a family or a work team) or by society as a whole. Indeed, a very 
important way of learning these habits or practices is by imitating other people, 
something that we do since early childhood. As social habits or practices are 
institutions (according to the broad definition proposed at the beginning of 
this paper), institutions too can embody tacit or practical knowledge. We employ 
this knowledge in our everyday social life.19 
Furthermore, the conceptual framework we use to interpret reality is very much 
a result of social interaction (as HODGSON, 1988, p. 119-120 argues, based 
on cognitive theory). The deeper cognitive function of institutions may also be 
performed at a subconscious level. 
6. INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE OF EXPECTATION 
In this section I turn to the relation between institutions and one of the major 
determinants of conscious decision-making, namely the state of expectation. 
17 For references to habits and customs as repositories of knowledge, see LANGLOIS (1985, p. 
315) on SCHUMPETER, LAWSON (1985, p. 917) and MEEKS (1991, p. 148-49) on 
KEYNES, VANBERG (1993, p. 182) and BUTOS AND KOPPL (1997) on HAYEK. 
HODGSON (1988, p. 10, 110, 126) develops an institutionalist tradition of emphasis on this 
point (see also RUTHERFORD, 1994, p. 62), which has some similarity with Hayek and the 
Austrian wing of New Institutional Economics. On routines as storage of operational knowledge, 
see NELSON AND WINTER (1982, p. 99). 
18 LAWSON (1997, p. 179) gives tacit knowledge this wider sense: ''discursively acquired knowledge 
can, with time and experience, become tacit knowledge, just as tacit knowledge may, on reflection, be 
rendered discursive.'' 
19 One could perhaps add to the distinction between tacit and other types of knowledge a distinction 
between tacit and other types of information. As far as I know, the latter distinction is not 
commonly made. Thinking of those who find it easier to accept the possible tacitness of knowledge 
than that of information, I refer to an informational-cognitive function of institutions (instead 
of an informational one), to account for the possibility that institutions provide us not only 
with information (which some people may not see as tacit) but also with tacit knowledge about 
the likely behaviour of others. 
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Before doing that, I should note that an important implication of the previous 
section is that the discussion of conscious decision-making has to refer, implicitly 
or explicitly, to a subconscious process of information selection, organization 
and interpretation, which, as argued above, is part of the cognitive function of 
institutions. This subconscious process crucially influences knowledge, which, 
as argued below, is one of the fundamental determinants of the state of 
expectation. In forming our state of expectation, we employ a cognitive 
framework that is only in part held consciously. This coexistence of conscious 
and subconscious elements clearly applies to knowledge, but it may also be true 
of other determinants of the state of expectation (to be mentioned shortly). 
Therefore, our conscious behaviour necessarily involves non-conscious aspects, 
and it is impossible to completely separate the former from the latter. Indeed, 
the presence of these non-conscious aspects free us to concentrate our conscious 
attention on fewer things. All this is quite consistent with Lawson's (1995) 
idea that the wider conception and understanding of which our expectations 
are part are often tacitly held. For all these reasons, the influence of institutions 
on the state of expectation is not restricted to a conscious level of behaviour. 
The state of expectation consists of expectations proper and the confidence 
with which these expectations are held, as Keynes (1936, p. 148) suggested. 
Dequech (1999a) develops this idea, proposing a more detailed scheme of 
determination of the state of expectation. For the purposes of the present paper, 
it is not necessary to present that scheme. It is sufficient to note that all the 
fundamental determinants of the state of expectation considered in that paper, 
namely, knowledge, animal spirits and creativity, are significantly influenced by 
the institutional setting in which individuals operate. At the same time, there 
are factors affecting knowledge, animal spirits and creativity which are particular 
to a single individual, to his/her experiences and his/her personal reactions to 
those experiences. 
Thus, it is worth commenting on Hodgson's (1989a) proposal for an 
institutionalist approach to expectations.20 Hodgson may give the impression 
that an extensive consideration of the influence of institutions on perception 
and behaviour would make expectations endogenous to a Keynes-cum- 
institutionalism model.21 This is how Arestis (1992, p. 100), for example, 
20 Hodgson does not distinguish between expectations, confidence and the state of expectation. 
21 FAVEREAU (1988b, p. 198, 203-05) also seems to argue that it is possible - and necessary - to 
develop Keynes's theory so as to make expectations endogenous, while at same time emphasizing 
a radical type of uncertainty. Again, this would also be accomplished by dealing with institutions 
- or, more specifically, conventions. 
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approvingly interprets him. For Hodgson (1988, p. 230), 'a crucial weakness of 
the General Theory in comparison with the rational expectations hypothesis is Keynes's 
treatment of long-term expectations as exogenous to the model! Hodgson (1985, p. 
20) refers to the rational expectations approach as an "alternative, endogenous 
treatment of expectations', from which he differentiates his own approach because 
in the latter "the processes of the formation and evolution of institutions themselves 
still remain exogenous! Furthermore, Hodgson (1985, p. 40) contends that one 
consequence of adopting an institutionalist approach "would have to be a recognition 
of the likelihood of divergent expectations, based on a non-uniformity of institutional 
structure and routine', as if institutions, routines and habits were the only or 
almost exclusive determinants of expectations and considering them were the 
only way by which one could envisage the possibility of divergent expectations. 
Nevertheless, Hodgson is not necessarily defending an approach in which 
expectations are completely endogenous, even though he undoubtedly criticizes 
treating them as exogenous. He recognizes largely indeterminate influences on 
expectations. Hodgson (1988, p. 225) does not "propose a kind of structural 
determinism in which the ideas and actions of economic agents are completely 
determined by the appropriate structures and institutions. Due recognition should be 
made for insight, will, flair, accident and the like' (see also p. 63). In short, Hodgson 
is not explicit about the endogeneity or exogeneity of expectations and is 
somewhat ambiguous in this respect. 
Fusfeld (1989, p. 361) may be right in claiming that "the reconstruction of the 
economic theory of individual behaviour requires an analysis that moves the socio- 
cultural environment out of the category of "parameter" and into the centre of 
analysis! The mistake would be not to accept that, as much as the social 
environment influences people's perception, expectations will always be to some 
degree exogenous in a theory dealing with uncertainty. In an effort towards a 
semantic agreement, expectations could be characterized zspartially endogenous, 
partially exogenous.22 
22 HODGSON may agree with this choice of words, as he (1988, p. 12) adopts the idea of partial 
indeterminacy. DAVIDSON may also agree, as he (1990, p. 74) writes that "choice can be, at 
least in part, due to an 'uncause*" (emphasis added). An 'uncause' may be conceived in relation 
to the causes admitted within the model. This avoids unnecessary controversy. It should be 
noted that a model is understood here in a broader sense than the one according to which a 
model is a system of equations. In other words, a model is not necessarily a formal one. An 
exogenous element of a model (which does not need to be called a variable, if the model is not 
formal) is defined here as one which is not explained within the model. If the model is not a 
formal one, one can speak of an element of it being partly endogenous, partly exogenous, in the 
sense that the model only explains part of that element. For DOW AND DOW (1985), there is 
here a methodological, more than semantic, problem. They condemn a dualist methodology 
that implies a dichotomy, among other things, between endogeneity and exogeneity of expectations 
(see also DOW( 1990). 
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Keeping in mind these warnings against an overemphasis on institutions, 
especially in a context of uncertainty, a connection between institutional 
economics and a treatment of the state of expectation inspired by Keynes can 
perhaps be more easily identified in the case of the perception of uncertainty, 
which is conceived of by Dequech (1999a) as one of the determinants of the 
confidence with which expectations are held, than in the case of expectations 
proper. The knowledge involved in the perception of uncertainty is the knowledge 
of institutions that help to reduce or increase the (ordinal) degree of uncertainty. 
Among these institutions, one can, following the Post Keynesians, highlight 
contracts, market-makers and conventions.23 The connection between this point 
and institutionalist theory becomes more visible once one realizes that what is 
involved here is the cognitive function of institutions. Contracts and market- 
makers are clearly intended to provide information on the future nominal value 
of important economic variables by providing information on the likely future 
behaviour of other people and of collective entities such as the state, responsible 
for enforcing contracts, and the market-makers, responsible for reducing the 
volatility of prices in organized markets. Conventions may also provide 
information on other people's behaviour, and even their deeper cognitive 
function helps to reduce the range of actions that are likely to be pursued by 
individuals sharing some social environment. 
Moreover, the fact that knowledge is affected by the institutional context in 
which it is produced also has to be considered here, together with the fact that 
uncertainty perception depends on the theory of economic reality implicitly or 
explicitly adopted by the decision-makers. The dominant approach in economics, 
which is institutionally strengthened by the prestige of the universities in which 
it is taught, the journals in which it is published, etc., neglects fundamental 
uncertainty. This may negatively influence the perception of uncertainty by 
practical decision-makers. 
This sort of institutional analysis can be extended to other factors affecting the 
state of expectation. This will have to wait, however, for further research. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The first relation to be established between institutions and economic behaviour 
under uncertainty has to do with the concept of uncertainty itself. Institutions 
23 To accept that institutions help to reduce or increase the (ordinal) degree of uncertainty one 
obviously has to accept that uncertainty is a matter of degrees. As seen above, there is no consensus 
on this issue. 
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are seen here as an important part of the ontological characterization of a social 
reality that is subject to unpredictable historical changes. Their existence is also 
seen as having an epistemological counterpart in terms of making some 
knowledge possible even in such a reality. 
Institutions influence economic behaviour under uncertainty in several ways. 
One of them is through their cognitive function, which is possible because even 
the fundamental type of uncertainty emphasized here does not imply complete 
ignorance. Institutions also constrain behaviour and influence the ends that 
people pursue. The identification of these different types of institutional influence 
on behaviour is combined here with a rejection of reductionism: individuals 
cannot be reduced to institutions, nor vice versa. 
These different ways in which institutions affect behaviour do not take place at 
only the highest level of consciousness. In particular, the cognitive function of 
institutions may be performed at a subconscious level. Institutions embody 
knowledge and influence people's very perception of reality. 
The discussion of the role of institutions improves our understanding of the 
state of expectation and, by extension, of conscious decision-making. That 
discussion helps us to acknowledge that the line separating the conscious from 
the non-conscious aspects of behaviour is not easy to draw. Moreover, knowledge, 
animal spirits and creativity (the ultimate determinants of the state of 
expectation) are conditioned by institutions, but, from the non-reductionist 
perspective adopted here, are not seen as determined by the latter. 
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